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MISSION STATEMENT
The Hamilton Project seeks to advance America’s promise of 
opportunity, prosperity, and growth.
We believe that today’s increasingly competitive global economy 
demands public policy ideas commensurate with the challenges 
of the 21st Century.  The Project’s economic strategy reflects a 
judgment that long-term prosperity is best achieved by fostering 
economic growth and broad participation in that growth, by 
enhancing individual economic security, and by embracing a role 
for effective government in making needed public investments. 
Our strategy calls for combining public investment, a secure social 
safety net, and fiscal discipline.  In that framework, the Project 
puts forward innovative proposals from leading economic thinkers 
— based on credible evidence and experience, not ideology or 
doctrine — to introduce new and effective policy options into the 
national debate.
The Project is named after Alexander Hamilton, the nation’s 
first Treasury Secretary, who laid the foundation for the modern 
American economy.  Hamilton stood for sound fiscal policy, 
believed that broad-based opportunity for advancement would 
drive American economic growth, and recognized that “prudent 
aids and encouragements on the part of government” are 
necessary to enhance and guide market forces.  The guiding 
principles of the Project remain consistent with these views.
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Introduction
Crime and high rates of incarceration impose tremendous costs on society, with lasting negative 
effects on individuals, families, and communities. Rates of crime in the United States have been falling steadily, but still 
constitute a serious economic and social challenge. At the same time, the incarceration rate in the United States is so 
high—more than 700 out of every 100,000 people are incarcerated—that both crime scholars and policymakers alike 
question whether, for nonviolent criminals in particular, the social costs of incarceration exceed the social benefits.
While there is significant focus on America’s incarceration policies, it is important to consider that crime continues to 
be a concern for policymakers, particularly at the state and local levels. Public spending on fighting crime—including 
the costs of incarceration, policing, and judicial and legal services—as well as private spending by households and 
businesses is substantial. There are also tremendous costs to the victims of crime, such as medical costs, lost earnings, 
and an overall loss in quality of life. Crime also stymies economic growth. For example, exposure to violence can inhibit 
effective schooling and other developmental outcomes (Burdick-Will 2013; Sharkey et al. 2012). Crime can induce 
citizens to migrate; economists estimate that each nonfatal violent crime reduces a city’s population by approximately 
one person, and each homicide reduces a city’s population by seventy persons (Cullen and Levitt 1999; Ludwig and 
Cook 2000). To the extent that migration diminishes a locality’s tax and consumer base, departures threaten a city’s 
ability to effectively educate children, provide social services, and maintain a vibrant economy.
The good news is that crime rates in the United States have been falling steadily since the 1990s, reversing an upward 
trend from the 1960s through the 1980s. There does not appear to be a consensus among scholars about how to account 
for the overall sharp decline, but contributing factors may include increased policing, rising incarceration rates, and 
the waning of the crack epidemic that was prevalent in the 1980s and early 1990s.
Despite the ongoing decline in crime, the incarceration rate in the United States remains at a historically 
unprecedented level. This high incarceration rate can have profound effects on society; research has shown 
that incarceration may impede employment and marriage prospects among former inmates, increase poverty 
depth and behavioral problems among their children, and amplify the spread of communicable diseases among 
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growth and broad participation in that growth. Elevated rates of 
crime and incarceration directly work against these principles, 
marginalizing individuals, devastating affected communities, and 
perpetuating inequality. In this spirit, we offer “Ten Economic 
Facts about Crime and Incarceration in the United States” to 
bring attention to recent trends in crime and incarceration, the 
characteristics of those who commit crimes and those who are 
incarcerated, and the social and economic costs of current policy.
Chapter 1 describes recent crime trends in the United States and 
the characteristics of criminal offenders and victims. Chapter 2 
focuses on the growth of mass incarceration in America. Chapter 
3 presents evidence on the economic and social costs of current 
crime and incarceration policy.
Introduction continued from page 1
disproportionately impacted communities (Raphael 2007). These 
effects are especially prevalent within disadvantaged communities 
and among those demographic groups that are more likely to 
face incarceration, namely young minority males. In addition, 
this high rate of incarceration is expensive for both federal and 
state governments. On average, in 2012, it cost more than $29,000 
to house an inmate in federal prison (Congressional Research 
Service 2013). In total, the United States spent over $80 billion 
on corrections expenditures in 2010, with more than 90 percent 
of these expenditures occurring at the state and local levels 
(Kyckelhahn and Martin 2013).
A founding principle of The Hamilton Project’s economic strategy 
is that long-term prosperity is best achieved by fostering economic 
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CHAPTER 1: The Landscape of   
Crime in the United States
Crime rates in the United States have been on a steady decline since the 1990s. Despite this 
improvement, particular demographic groups still exhibit high rates of criminal activity while 
others remain especially likely to be victims of crime.
1. Crime rates have steadily declined over the past twenty-five years.
2. Low-income individuals are more likely than higher-income 
individuals to be victims of crime.
3. The majority of criminal offenders are younger than age thirty.
4. Disadvantaged youths engage in riskier criminal behavior.
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approximately 14 percent. During this same decade, sentencing 
policies grew stricter and the U.S. prison population swelled, 
which had both deterrence (i.e., prevention of further crime by 
increasing the threat of punishment) and incapacitation (i.e., the 
inability to commit a crime because of being imprisoned) effects 
on criminals (Abrams 2011; Johnson and Raphael 2012; Levitt 
2004). The waning of the crack epidemic reduced crime primarily 
through a decline in the homicide rates associated with crack 
markets in the late 1980s.
Though crime rates have fallen, they remain an important policy 
issue. In particular, some communities, often those with low-
income residents, still experience elevated rates of certain types of 
crime despite the national decline.
Crime rates have steadily declined over the past 
twenty-five years.
After a significant explosion in crime rates between the 1960s and 
the 1980s, the United States has experienced a steady decline in crime 
rates over the past twenty-five years. As illustrated in figure 1, crime 
rates fell nearly 30 percent between 1991 and 2001, and subsequently 
fell an additional 22 percent between 2001 and 2012. This measure, 
calculated by the FBI, incorporates both violent crimes (e.g., murder 
and aggravated assault) and property crimes (e.g., burglary and 
larceny-theft). Individually, rates of property and violent crime have 
followed similar trends, falling 29 percent and 33 percent, respectively, 
between 1991 and 2001 (U.S. Department of Justice [DOJ] 2010b).
Social scientists have struggled to provide adequate explanations 
for the sharp and persistent decline in crime rates. Economists 
have focused on a few potential factors—including an increased 
number of police on the streets, rising rates of incarceration, and 
the waning of the crack epidemic—to explain the drop in crime 
(Levitt 2004). In the 1990s, police officers per capita increased by 
1.
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FIGURE 1.
Crime Rate in the United States, 1960–2012
After being particularly elevated during the 1970s and 1980s, the crime rate fell nearly 45 percent between 1990 and 2012.
Sources: DOJ 2010b; authors’ calculations.
Note: The crime rate includes all violent crimes (i.e., aggravated assault, forcible rape, murder, and robbery) and property crimes (i.e., burglary, larceny-theft, 
and motor vehicle theft).
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of poverty—suggests that moving into a less-poor neighborhood 
significantly reduces child criminal victimization rates. In 
particular, children of families that moved as a result of receiving 
both a housing voucher to move to a new location and counseling 
assistance experienced personal crime victimization rates that 
were 13 percentage points lower than those who did not receive any 
voucher or assistance (Katz, Kling, and Liebman 2000).
Victims of personal crimes face both tangible costs, including 
medical costs, lost earnings, and costs related to victim assistance 
programs, and intangible costs, such as pain, suffering, and lost 
quality of life (Miller, Cohen, and Wiersama 1996). There are 
also public health consequences to crime victimization. Since 
homicide rates are so high for young African American men, men 
in this demographic group lose more years of life before age sixty-
five to homicide than they do to heart disease, which is the nation’s 
overall leading killer (Heller et al. 2013).
Across all types of personal crimes, victimization rates are 
significantly higher for individuals living in low-income households, 
as shown in figure 2. In 2008, the latest year for which data are 
available, the victimization rate for all personal crimes among 
individuals with family incomes of less than $15,000 was over three 
times the rate of those with family incomes of $75,000 or more 
(DOJ 2010a). The most prevalent crime for low-income victims was 
assault, followed closely by acts of attempted violence, at 33 victims 
and 28 victims per 1,000 residents, respectively. For those in the 
higher-income bracket, these rates were significantly lower at only 
11 victims and 9 victims per 1,000 residents, respectively.
Because crime tends to concentrate in disadvantaged areas, low-
income individuals living in these communities are even more likely 
to be victims. Notably, evidence from the Moving to Opportunity 
program—a multiyear federal research demonstration project that 
combined rental assistance with housing counseling to help families 
with very low incomes move from areas with a high concentration 
Low-income individuals are more likely than 
higher-income individuals to be victims of 
crime.
2.
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Sources: DOJ 2010a; authors’ calculations.
Note: The victimization rate is defined as the number of individuals who were victims of crime over a six-month period per every 1,000 persons age twelve or older.
FIGURE 2.
Victimization Rates for Persons Age 12 or Older, by Type of Crime and Annual Family 
Income, 2008
In 2008, individuals with annual family incomes of less than $15,000 were at least three times more likely to be victims of personal 
crimes—such as rape and assault—than were individuals with annual family incomes of $75,000 or more.
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The majority of criminal offenders are 
younger than age thirty.3.
Juveniles make up a significant portion of offenders each year. 
More than one quarter (27 percent) of known offenders—defined 
as individuals with at least one identifiable characteristic that were 
involved in a crime incident, whether or not an arrest was made—
were individuals ages eleven to twenty, and an additional 34 percent 
were ages twenty-one to thirty; all other individuals composed 
fewer than 40 percent of offenders. As seen in figure 3, this trend 
holds for all types of crimes. More specifically, 55  percent of 
offenders committing crimes against persons (such as assault and 
sex offenses) were ages eleven to thirty. For crimes against property 
(such as larceny-theft and vandalism) and crimes against society 
(including drug offenses and weapon law violations), 63  percent 
and 66 percent of offenders, respectively, were individuals in the 
eleven-to-thirty age group.
A stark difference in the number of offenders by gender is also 
evident. Most crimes—whether against persons, property, or 
society—are committed by men; of criminal offenders with 
known gender, 72 percent are male. This trend for gender follows 
for crimes against persons (73 percent), crimes against property 
(70 percent), and crimes against society (77 percent) (DOJ 2012). 
Combined, these facts indicate that most offenders in the United 
States are young men.
Some social scientists explain this age profile of crime by appealing 
to a biological perspective on criminal behavior, focusing on the 
impaired decision-making capabilities of the adolescent brain in 
particular. There are also numerous social theories that emphasize 
youth susceptibility to societal pressures, namely their concern 
with identity formation, peer reactions, and establishing their 
independence (O’Donoghue and Rabin 2001).
Chapter 1: The Landscape of Crime in the United States
Sources: DOJ 2012; authors’ calculations.
Note: The FBI defines crimes against persons as crimes whose victims are always individuals. Crimes against property are those with the goal of obtaining 
money, property, or some other benefit. Crimes against society are those that represent society’s prohibition against engaging in certain types of activity 
(DOJ 2011). Offender data include characteristics of each offender involved in a crime incident whether or not an arrest was made; offenders with unknown 
ages are excluded from the analysis. Additionally, incidents with unknown offenders—1,741,162 incidents in 2012—are excluded. For more details, see the 
technical appendix.
FIGURE 3.
Number of Offenders in the United States, by Age and Offense Category, 2012
More than 60 percent of known criminal offenders are under the age of thirty, with individuals ages eleven to twenty constituting 
roughly 27 percent of offenders, and individuals ages twenty-one to thirty making up an additional 34 percent.
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Disadvantaged youths engage in riskier 
criminal behavior.4.
Youths from low-income families (those with incomes at or below 
200 percent of the federal poverty level) are equally likely to commit 
drug-related offenses than are their higher-income counterparts. 
As seen in figure 4, low-income youths are just as likely to use 
marijuana by age sixteen, and to use other drugs or sell drugs by age 
eighteen. In contrast, low-income youths are more likely to engage in 
violent and property crimes than are youths from middle- and high-
income families. In particular, low-income youths are significantly 
more likely to attack someone or get into a fight, join a gang, or steal 
something worth more than $50. In other words, youths from low-
income families are more likely to engage in crimes that involve or 
affect other people than are youths from higher-income families.
A standard economics explanation for the socioeconomic profile 
of property crime is that for poor youths the attractiveness of 
alternatives to crime is low: if employment opportunities are 
limited for teens living in poor neighborhoods, then property 
crime becomes relatively more attractive. The heightened 
likelihood of violent crime among poor youths raises the issue 
of automatic behaviors—in other words, youths intuitively 
responding to perceived threats—which has become the focus of 
recent research in this field. However, the similar rates of drug 
use across teens from different income groups is consistent with 
a more general model of risky teenage activity associated with the 
so-called impaired decision-making capabilities of the adolescent 
brain.
Some intriguing recent academic work has proposed that adverse 
youth outcomes are often the result of quick errors in judgment 
and decision-making. In particular, hostile attribution bias—
hypervigilance to threat cues and the tendency to overattribute 
malevolent intent to others—appears to be more common among 
disadvantaged youths, partly because these youths grow up with 
a heightened risk of having experienced abuse (Dodge, Bates, and 
Pettit 1990; Heller et al. 2013). Some experts have consequently 
begun promoting cognitive behavioral therapy for these youths 
to help them recognize and rewire the automatic behaviors and 
biased beliefs that often result in judgment and decision-making 
errors. Promising results from several experiments in Chicago—
in particular, improved schooling outcomes and fewer arrests for 
violent crimes—suggest that it is possible to change the outcomes 
of disadvantaged youths simply by helping them recognize when 
their automatic responses may trigger negative outcomes (Heller et 
al. 2013).
Chapter 1: The Landscape of Crime in the United States
Source: Kent 2009.
Note: Original data are derived from the 1997 National Longitudinal Survey of Youth. Adolescent risk behaviors are measured up to age eighteen, except for 
marijuana usage, which is measured up to age sixteen. Low-income families are those whose incomes are at or below 200 percent of the the federal poverty level 
(FPL). Middle-income families have incomes between 201 and 400 percent of the FPL. High-income families have incomes at or above 401 percent of the FPL.
FIGURE 4.
Adolescent Risk Behaviors by Family Income Level
Although youths from low-income families are as likely to use or sell drugs as are their higher-income counterparts, the former are 
significantly more likely to engage in criminal activities that target other people.
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CHAPTER 2: The Growth of   
Mass Incarceration in America
The incarceration rate in the United States is now at a historically unprecedented level and is far 
above the typical rate in other developed countries. As a result, imprisonment has become an 
inevitable reality for subsets of the American population. 
5. Federal and state policies have driven up the incarceration rate over 
the past thirty years.
6. The U.S. incarceration rate is more than six times that of the typical 
OECD nation.
7. There is nearly a 70 percent chance that an African American man 
without a high school diploma will be imprisoned by his mid-thirties.
The Hamilton Project  •  Brookings  9
The incarceration rate in the United States—defined as the number 
of inmates in local jails, state prisons, federal prisons, and privately 
operated facilities per every 100,000 U.S. residents—increased during 
the past three decades, from 220 in 1980 to 756 in 2008, before 
retreating slightly to 710 in 2012 (as seen in figure 5).
The incarceration rate is driven by three factors: crime rates, the 
number of prison sentences per number of crimes committed, and 
expected time served in prison among those sentenced (Raphael 
2011). Academic evidence suggests that increases in crime cannot 
explain the growth in the incarceration rate since the 1980s (Raphael 
and Stoll 2013). However, the likelihood that an arrested offender will 
be sent to prison, as well as the time prisoners can expect to serve, 
has increased for all types of crime (Raphael and Stoll 2009, 2013). 
Given that both the likelihood of going to prison and sentence lengths 
are heavily influenced by adjudication outcomes and the types of 
punishment levied, most of the growth in the incarceration rate can 
be attributed to changes in policy (Raphael and Stoll 2013).
Policymakers at the federal and state levels have created a stricter 
criminal justice system in the past three decades. For example, 
state laws and federal laws—such as the Sentencing Reform Act of 
1984—established greater structure in sentencing through specified 
guidelines for each offense. Additionally, between 1975 and 2002, 
all fifty states adopted some form of mandatory-sentencing law 
specifying minimum prison sentences for specific offenses. In fact, 
nearly three quarters of states and the federal government—through 
laws like the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986—enacted mandatory-
sentencing laws for possession or trafficking of illegal drugs. Many 
states also adopted repeat offender laws, known as “three strikes” 
laws, which strengthened the sentences of those with prior felony 
convictions. These policies, among others, are believed to have made 
the United States tougher on those who commit crime, raising the 
incarceration rate through increased admissions and longer sentences 
(Raphael and Stoll 2013).
The continued growth in the federal prison population stands in 
contrast to recent trends in state prison populations. Between 2008 
and 2012, the number of inmates in state correctional facilities 
decreased by approximately 4 percent (from roughly 1.41 million 
to 1.35 million), while the number of inmates in federal prisons 
increased by more than 8 percent (from approximately 201,000 to 
nearly 218,000) (Carson and Golinelli 2013). This increase in federal 
imprisonment rates has been driven by increases in immigration-
related admissions. Between 2003 and 2011, admissions to federal 
prisons for immigration-related offenses increased by 83 percent, 
rising from 13,100 to 23,939 (DOJ n.d.).
Sources: Austin et al. 2000; Cahalan 1986; personal communication with E. Ann Carson, Bureau of Justice Statistics, January 24, 2014; Census Bureau 
2001; Glaze 2010, 2011; Glaze and Herberman 2013; Raphael and Stoll 2013; Sabol, Couture, and Harrison 2007; Sabol, West, and Cooper 2010; authors’ 
calculations.
Note: Incarceration rate refers to the total number of inmates in custody of local jails, state and federal prisons, and privately operated facilities within that 
year per 100,000 U.S. residents. The three events highlighted in this figure are examples of the many policy changes that are believed to have influenced the 
incarceration rate since the 1980s. For more details, see the technical appendix.
FIGURE 5.
Incarceration Rate in the United States, 1960–2012
Federal policies, such as the Sentencing Reform Act, and state policies, such as “three strikes” legislation, were major contributing factors 
to the 222 percent increase in the incarceration rate between 1980 and 2012.
Chapter 2: The Growth of Mass Incarceration in America
Federal and state policies have driven up the 
incarceration rate over the past thirty years.5.
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Indeed, mass incarceration appears to be a relatively unique and recent 
American phenomenon.
A variety of factors can explain the discrepancy in incarceration rates. 
One important factor is higher crime rates, especially rates of violent 
crimes: the homicide rate in the United States is approximately four 
times the typical rate among the nations in figure 6 (United Nations 
Office on Drugs and Crime 2014). Additionally, drug control policies 
in the United States—which have largely not been replicated in other 
Western countries—have prominently contributed to the rising 
incarcerated population over the past several decades (Donahue, 
Ewing, and Peloquin 2011). Another important factor is sentencing 
policy; in particular, the United States imposes much longer prison 
sentences for drug-related offenses than do many economically 
similar nations. For example, the average expected time served for 
drug offenses is twenty-three months in the United States, in contrast 
to twelve months in England and Wales and seven months in France 
(Lynch and Pridemore 2011).
The U.S. incarceration rate is more than six 
times that of the typical OECD nation.6.
The United States is an international outlier when it comes to 
incarceration rates. In 2012, the incarceration rate in the United 
States—which includes inmates in the custody of local jails, state 
or federal prisons, and privately operated facilities—was 710 per 
100,000 U.S. residents (Glaze and Herberman 2013). This puts the U.S. 
incarceration rate at more than five times the typical global rate of 130, 
and more than twice the incarceration rate of 90 percent of the world’s 
countries (Walmsley 2013).
The U.S. incarceration rate in 2012 was significantly higher than those 
of its neighbors: Canada’s and Mexico’s incarceration rates were 118 
and 210, respectively. Moreover, the U.S. incarceration rate is more 
than six times higher than the typical rate of 115 for a nation in the 
Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD) 
(Walmsley 2013). As seen in figure 6, in recent years incarceration rates 
in OECD nations have ranged from 47 to 266; these rates are relatively 
comparable to the rates seen in the United States prior to the 1980s. 
Chapter 2: The Growth of Mass Incarceration in America
FIGURE 6.
Incarceration Rates in OECD Countries
With an incarceration rate of 710 inmates per 100,000 residents, the United States stands in stark contrast to the typical incarceration rate 
of 115 among OECD nations.
Sources: Glaze and Herberman 2013; Walmsley 2013; authors’ calculations.
Note: All incarceration rates are from 2013, with the exception of the rates for Canada, Greece, Israel, the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, 
and the United States; of these countries, all rates are from 2012, with the exception of Canada, whose rate is from 2011–12. The incarceration 
rate for the United Kingdom is a weighted average of England and Wales, Northern Ireland, and Scotland. For more details, see the technical 
appendix.
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discrepancies between races became more apparent. Men born in the 
latest birth cohort, 1975–79, reached their mid-thirties around 2010; 
for this cohort, the difference in cumulative risk of imprisonment 
between white and African American men is more than double the 
difference for the first birth cohort (as seen on the far right of figure 7).
These racial disparities become particularly striking when 
considering men with low educational attainment. Over 53 
percentage points distance white and African American male high 
school dropouts in the latest birth cohort (depicted by the difference 
between the two dashed lines on the far right of figure 7), with male 
African American high school dropouts facing a nearly 70 percent 
cumulative risk of imprisonment. This high risk of imprisonment 
translates into a higher chance of being in prison than of being 
employed. For African American men in general, it translates into a 
higher chance of spending time in prison than of graduating with a 
four-year college degree (Pettit 2012; Pettit and Western 2004).
For certain demographic groups, incarceration has become a fact 
of life. Figure 7 illustrates the cumulative risk of imprisonment for 
men by race, education, and birth cohort. As described by Pettit and 
Western (2004), the cumulative risk of imprisonment is the projected 
lifetime likelihood of serving time for a person born in a specific year. 
Specifically, each point reflects the percent chance that a man born 
within a given range of years will have spent time in prison by age 
thirty to thirty-four. Notably, most men who are ever incarcerated enter 
prison for the first time before age thirty-five, and so these cumulative 
risks by age thirty to thirty-four are reflective of lifetime risks.
Men in the first birth cohort, 1945–49, reached their mid-thirties 
by 1980 just as the incarceration rate began a steady incline. For all 
education levels within this age group, only an 8-percentage point 
differential separated white and African American men in terms of 
imprisonment risk (depicted by the difference between the two solid 
lines on the far left of figure 7). As the incarceration rate rose, however, 
Chapter 2: The Growth of Mass Incarceration in America
FIGURE 7.
Cumulative Risk of Imprisonment by Age 30–34 for Men Born Between 1945–49 and 
1975–79, by Race and Education
Among men born between 1975 and 1979, an African American high school dropout has nearly a 70 percent chance of being imprisoned 
by his mid-thirties.
Source: Western and Wildeman 2009.
Note: Cumulative risk of imprisonment is the projected lifetime likelihood of imprisonment for a person born in a specific range of years. For more details, see 
the technical appendix.
There is nearly a 70 percent chance that an 
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CHAPTER 3: The Economic and Social Costs  
of  Crime and Incarceration
Today’s high rate of incarceration is considerably costly to American taxpayers, with state governments 
bearing the bulk of the fiscal burden. In addition to these budgetary costs, current incarceration 
policy generates economic and social costs for both those imprisoned and their families.
8. Per capita expenditures on corrections more than tripled over the 
past thirty years.
9. By their fourteenth birthday, African American children whose 
fathers do not have a high school diploma are more likely than not to 
see their fathers incarcerated.
10. Juvenile incarceration can have lasting impacts on a young person’s 
future.
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corrections spending per capita (Census Bureau 2001, 2013; Raphael 
and Stoll 2013). Per capita expenditures on corrections (denoted by 
the dashed line in figure 8) more than tripled between 1980 and 
2010. In real terms, each U.S. resident on average contributed $260 
to corrections expenditures in 2010, which stands in stark contrast 
to the $77 each resident contributed in 1980.
Crime-related expenditures generate a significant strain on state 
and federal budgets, leading some to question whether public funds 
are best spent incarcerating nonviolent criminals. Preliminary 
evidence from the recent policy experience in California—in 
which a substantial number of nonviolent criminals were released 
from state and federal prisons—suggests that alternatives to 
incarceration for nonviolent offenders (e.g., electronic monitoring 
and house arrest) can lead to slightly higher rates of property 
crime, but have no statistically significant impact on violent crime 
(Lofstrom and Raphael 2013). These conclusions have led some 
experts to suggest that public safety priorities could better be 
achieved by incarcerating fewer nonviolent criminals, combined 
with spending more on education and policing (ibid.).
Per capita expenditures on corrections more 
than tripled over the past thirty years.8.
In 2010, the United States spent more than $80 billion on 
corrections expenditures at the federal, state, and local levels. 
Corrections expenditures fund the supervision, confinement, 
and rehabilitation of adults and juveniles convicted of offenses 
against the law, and the confinement of persons awaiting trial 
and adjudication (Kyckelhahn 2013). As figure 8 illustrates, total 
corrections expenditures more than quadrupled over the past 
twenty years in real terms, from approximately $17 billion in 1980 
to more than $80 billion in 2010. When including expenditures for 
police protection and judicial and legal services, the direct costs of 
crime rise to $261 billion (Kyckelhahn and Martin 2013).
Most corrections expenditures have historically occurred at the state 
level and continue to do so. As shown in figure 8, in 2010, more than 
57 percent of direct cash outlays for corrections came from state 
governments, compared to 10 percent from the federal government 
and nearly 33 percent from local governments. Increased 
expenditures at every level of government are not surprising given 
the growth in incarceration, which has far outstripped population 
growth, leading to a higher rate of incarceration and higher 
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FIGURE 8.
Total Corrections Expenditures by Level of Government and Per Capita Expenditures, 
1980–2010
In real terms, total corrections expenditures today are more than 350 percent higher than they were in 1980, while per capita 
expenditures increased nearly 250 percent over the same period.
Sources: Bauer 2003a, 2003b; Census Bureau 2001, 2011, 2013; Gifford 2001; Hughes 2006, 2007; Hughes and Perry 2005; Perry 2005, 2008; Kyckelhahn 
2012a, 2012b, 2012c; Kyckelhahn and Martin 2013; authors’ calculations.
Note: The dollar figures are adjusted to 2010 dollars using the CPI-U-RS (Consumer Price Index Research Series Using Current Methods). Population estimates for 
each year are taken from the Census Bureau’s estimates for July 1 of that year. The figure includes only direct expenditures so as not to double count the value of 
intergovernmental grants. For more details, see the technical appendix.
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than are mothers. These risks of imprisonment are magnified when 
parental educational attainment is taken into account; high school 
dropouts are much more likely to be imprisoned than are individuals 
with higher levels of education. Fathers who are high school dropouts 
face a cumulative risk of imprisonment that is approximately four 
times higher than that of fathers with some college education. An 
African American child with a father who dropped out of high school 
has more than a 50 percent chance of seeing that father incarcerated 
by the time the child reaches age fourteen.
Young children (ages two to six) and school-aged children of 
incarcerated parents have been shown to have emotional problems and 
to demonstrate weak academic performance and behavioral problems, 
respectively. It is unclear, however, the extent to which these problems 
result from having an incarcerated parent as opposed to stemming 
from the other risk factors faced by families of incarcerated individuals; 
incarcerated parents tend to have low levels of education and high rates 
of poverty, in addition to frequently having issues with drugs, alcohol, 
and mental illness  (Center for Research on Child Wellbeing 2008).
In 2010, approximately 2.7 million children, or over 3 percent of 
all children in the United States, had a parent in prison (The Pew 
Charitable Trusts 2010). As of 2007, an estimated 53 percent of prisoners 
in the United States were parents of children under age eighteen, a 
majority being fathers (Glaze and Maruschak 2010).  Furthermore, it 
is not the case that these parents were already disengaged from their 
children’s lives. For example, in 2007, approximately half of parents 
in state prisons were the primary provider of financial support for 
their children—and nearly half had lived with their children—prior 
to incarceration (ibid.). Furthermore, fathers often are required to pay 
child support during their incarceration, and since they make little 
to no money during their incarceration, they often accumulate child 
support debt. 
Figure 9 illustrates the cumulative risk of imprisonment for parents—
or the projected lifetime likelihood of serving time for a person 
born in a specific year—by the time their child turns fourteen, by 
child’s race and their own educational attainment (Wildeman 2009). 
Regardless of race, fathers are much more likely to be imprisoned 
FIGURE 9.
Cumulative Risk of Parent’s Imprisonment for Children by Age 14, by Race and Parent’s 
Education
An African American child whose father did not complete high school has a 50 percent chance of seeing his or her father incarcerated by 
the time the child reaches his or her fourteenth birthday.
Source: Wildeman 2009.
Note: Cumulative risk of imprisonment is the projected lifetime likelihood of a parent’s imprisonment by the time his or her child turns fourteen. 
Children included in the analysis were born in 1990. For more details, see the technical appendix.
By their fourteenth birthday, African American 
children whose fathers do not have a high 
school diploma are more likely than not to see 
their fathers incarcerated.
9.
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 Juvenile incarceration can have lasting impacts 
on a young person’s future.10.
In addition to these direct costs, juvenile detention is believed to 
have significant effects on a youth’s future since it jeopardizes his or 
her accumulation of human and social capital during an important 
developmental stage. Studies have found it difficult to estimate 
this effect, given that incarcerated juveniles differ across many 
dimensions from those who are not incarcerated. Aizer and Doyle 
(2013) overcome this difficulty by using randomly assigned judges 
to estimate the difference in adult outcomes between youths sent to 
juvenile detention and youths who were charged with a similar crime, 
but who were not sent to juvenile detention. The authors find that 
sending a youth to juvenile detention has a significant negative impact 
on that youth’s adult outcomes. As illustrated in figure 10, juvenile 
incarceration is estimated to decrease the likelihood of high school 
graduation by 13 percentage points and increase the likelihood of 
incarceration as an adult by 22 percentage points. In particular, those 
who are incarcerated as juveniles are 15 percentage points more likely 
to be incarcerated as adults for violent crimes or 14 percentage points 
more likely to be incarcerated as adults for property crimes.
After increasing steadily between 1975 and 1999, the rate of youth 
confinement began declining in 2000, with the decline accelerating 
in recent years (Annie E. Casey Foundation 2013). In 2011, there 
were 64,423 detained youths, a rate of roughly 2 out of every 1,000 
juveniles ages ten and older (Sickmund et al. 2013). Detained juveniles 
include those placed in a facility as part of a court-ordered disposition 
(68 percent); juveniles awaiting a court hearing, adjudication, 
disposition, or placement elsewhere (31 percent); and juveniles who 
were voluntarily admitted to a facility in lieu of adjudication as part of 
a diversion agreement (1 percent) (ibid.).
Youths are incarcerated for a variety of crimes. In 2011, 22,964 
juveniles (37 percent of juvenile detainees) were detained for a violent 
offense, and 14,705 (24 percent) were detained for a property offense. 
More than 70 percent of youth offenders are detained in public 
facilities, for which the cost is estimated to be approximately $240 per 
person each day, or around $88,000 per person each year (Petteruti, 
Walsh, and Velazquez 2009).
Chapter 3 : The Economic and Social Costs of Crime and Incarceration
FIGURE 10.
Effect of Juvenile Incarceration on Likelihood of High School Graduation and Adult 
Imprisonment
Juvenile incarceration reduces the likelihood of high school graduation by more than 13 percentage points, and increases the probability 
of returning to prison as an adult by over 22 percentage points, as compared to nondetained juvenile offenders.
Source: Aizer and Doyle 2013.
Note: Bars show statistically significant regression estimates of the causal effect of juvenile incarceration on high school completion and on 
adult recidivism. For more details, see the technical appendix.
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1. Crime rates have steadily declined over the past 
twenty-five years.
Figure 1. Crime Rate in the United States, 1960–2012
Sources: DOJ 2010b; authors’ calculations.
Note: The U.S. crime rate is the sum of the violent crime 
rates (i.e., aggravated assault, forcible rape, murder and 
nonnegligent manslaughter, and robbery) and property crime 
rates (i.e., burglary, larceny-theft, and motor vehicle theft) 
from the FBI’s Uniform Crime Reporting Program. This 
program includes crime statistics gathered by the FBI from 
law enforcement agencies across the United States.
2. Low-income individuals are more likely than 
higher-income individuals to be victims of crime.
Figure 2. Victimization Rates for Persons Age 12 or Older, 
by Type of Crime and Annual Family Income, 2008
Sources: DOJ 2010a; authors’ calculations.
Note: Victimization data come from the FBI’s National Crime 
Victimization Survey. The victimization rate is defined as 
the number of individuals who were victims of crime over a 
six-month period per every 1,000 persons age twelve or older. 
Persons whose family income level was not ascertained are 
excluded from this figure. Income brackets are combined 
using population data for each income range.
3. The majority of criminal offenders are younger 
than age thirty.
Figure 3. Number of Offenders in the United States, by Age 
and Offense Category, 2012
Sources: DOJ 2012; authors’ calculations.
Note: The FBI defines crimes against persons as crimes 
whose victims are always individuals (e.g., assault, murder, 
and rape). Crimes against property are those with the goal 
of obtaining money, property, or some other benefit (e.g., 
bribery, burglary, and robbery). Crimes against society are 
those that represent society’s prohibition against engaging in 
certain types of activity (e.g., drug violations, gambling, and 
prostitution) (DOJ 2011).
Offender data come from the FBI’s National Incident-Based 
Reporting System. This includes characteristics (e.g., age, 
sex, and race) of each offender involved in a crime incident 
whether or not an arrest was made. The data, which aim 
to capture any information known to law enforcement 
concerning the offenders even though they may not have 
been identified, are reported by law enforcement agencies. 
An additional 1,741,162 incidents had unknown offenders, 
meaning there is no known information about the offender. 
Offenders with unknown ages are excluded from this 
figure. (This paragraph is based on the authors’ email 
correspondence with the Criminal Justice Information Series 
at the FBI, March 2014.)
4. Disadvantaged youths engage in riskier criminal 
behavior.
Figure 4. Adolescent Risk Behaviors by Family Income Level
Source: Kent 2009.
Note: Original data are derived from the 1997 National 
Longitudinal Survey of Youth, which followed a sample of 
adolescents in 1997 into young adulthood and recorded 
their behavior and outcomes through annual interviews. 
Adolescent risk behaviors are measured up to age eighteen, 
with the exception of marijuana use, which is measured up to 
age sixteen. Low-income families are defined as those whose 
incomes are at or below 200 percent of the federal poverty 
level (FPL). Middle-income families are defined as those 
with incomes between 201 and 400 percent of the FPL, and 
high-income families are defined as those with incomes at or 
above 401 percent of the FPL.
5. Federal and state policies have driven up the 
incarceration rate over the past thirty years.
Figure 5. Incarceration Rate in the United States, 1960–2012
Sources: Austin et al. 2000; Cahalan 1986; personal 
communication with E. Ann Carson, Bureau of Justice 
Statistics, January 24, 2014; Census Bureau 2001; Glaze 2010, 
2011; Glaze and Herberman 2013; Raphael and Stoll 2013; 
Sabol, Couture, and Harrison 2007; Sabol, West, and Cooper 
2010; authors’ calculations.
Note: The incarceration rate refers to the total number of 
inmates in custody of local jails, state or federal prisons, 
and privately operated facilities within the year per 100,000 
U.S. residents. Incarceration rates for 1960 and 1970 come 
from Cahalan (1986). Incarceration rates for 1980 to 1999 
are calculated by dividing the total incarcerated population 
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(both prison and jail) by the U.S. resident population on 
January 1 of the following year taken from Census Bureau 
(2001). Estimates of the total incarcerated population come 
from personal communication with E. Ann Carson, Bureau 
of Justice Statistics, January 24, 2014. This quotient is then 
multiplied by 100,000 in order to get the incarceration 
rate per 100,000 residents. Incarceration rates for 2000 to 
2006 come from Sabol, Couture, and Harrison (2007). The 
incarceration rate for 2007 comes from Sabol, West, and 
Cooper (2010). The incarceration rate for 2008 comes from 
Glaze (2010). Incarceration rates for 2009 and 2010 come 
from Glaze (2011). Incarceration rates for 2011 and 2012 
come from Glaze and Herberman (2013).
Dates for the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 and the Anti-
Drug Abuse Act of 1986 come from Raphael and Stoll (2013). 
The number of states that adopted or strengthened the “three 
strikes” legislation between 1993 and 1997 come from Austin 
and colleagues (2000). The three events highlighted in the 
figure are examples of the many policy changes that are 
believed to have influenced the incarceration rate since the 
1980s.
6. The U.S. incarceration rate is more than six times 
that of the typical OECD nation.
Figure 6. Incarceration Rates in OECD Countries
Sources: Glaze and Herberman 2013; Walmsley 2013; authors’ 
calculations.
Note: The typical Organisation for Economic Co-Operation 
and Development (OECD) incarceration rate refers to the 
median incarceration rate among all OECD nations.  The 
incarceration rate for the United States comes from Glaze 
and Herberman (2013). Data for all other OECD nations 
come from Walmsley (2013). All incarceration rates are 
for 2013, with the exception of Canada, Greece, Israel, 
the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United 
States. Of these countries, all rates are for 2012, with the 
exception of Canada, whose rate is from 2011 to 2012. The 
incarceration rate for the United Kingdom is a weighted 
average of the prison population rates of England and Wales, 
Northern Ireland, and Scotland based on their estimated 
national populations. The incarceration rate for France 
includes metropolitan France and excludes departments and 
territories in Africa, the Americas, and Oceania.
7. There is nearly a 70 percent chance that an African 
American man without a high school diploma will be 
imprisoned by his mid-thirties.
Figure 7. Cumulative Risk of Imprisonment by Age 30–34 
for Men Born Between 1945–49 and 1975–79, by Race and 
Education
Source: Western and Wildeman 2009.
Note: In this figure, imprisonment is defined as a sentence 
of twelve months or longer for a felony conviction. The 
cumulative risk of imprisonment for men is calculated 
using life table methods, and requires age-specific first-
incarceration rates. Though this cumulative risk is 
technically the likelihood of going to jail or prison by age 
thirty to thirty-four, these estimates roughly describe 
lifetime risks because most inmates enter prison for the first 
time before age thirty-five. For more details, see Pettit and 
Western (2004).
8. Per capita expenditures on corrections more than 
tripled over the past thirty years.
Figure 8. Total Corrections Expenditures by Level of 
Government and Per Capita Expenditures, 1980–2010
Sources: Bauer 2003a, 2003b; Census Bureau 2001, 2011, 
2013; Gifford 2001; Hughes 2006, 2007; Hughes and Perry 
2005; Perry 2005, 2008; Kyckelhahn 2012a, 2012b, 2012c; 
Kyckelhahn and Martin 2013; authors’ calculations.
Note: Total corrections expenditures by type of government 
come from the Department of Justice’s (DOJ’s) annual 
Justice Expenditures and Employment Extracts. Only direct 
expenditures are included so as to not double count the 
value of intergovernmental grants. Expenditure figures are 
adjusted to 2010 dollars using the CPI-U-RS. Estimates of the 
U.S. resident population are the Census Bureau’s population 
estimates for July of that year. Per capita expenditures are then 
calculated by dividing the total corrections expenditures by 
the resident population in that year.
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9. By their fourteenth birthday, African American 
children whose fathers do not have a high school 
diploma are more likely than not to see their fathers 
incarcerated.
Figure 9. Cumulative Risk of Parent’s Imprisonment for 
Children by Age 14, by Race and Parent’s Education
Source: Wildeman 2009.
Note: Children included in the figure were born in 1990. 
The cumulative risk of parental imprisonment for children 
by the time they turn fourteen is calculated using life table 
methods, and relies on the number of children experiencing 
parental imprisonment for the first time at any age. Original 
analysis was performed using three data sets: the “Surveys 
of Inmates of State and Federal Correctional Facilities,” the 
year-end counts of prisoners, and the National Corrections 
Reporting Program. For more details, see Wildeman (2009).
10. Juvenile incarceration can have lasting impacts on 
a young person’s future.
Figure 10. Effect of Juvenile Incarceration on Likelihood of 
High School Graduation and Adult Imprisonment
Source: Aizer and Doyle 2013.
Note: Bars show statistically significant regression estimates 
(at the 5 percent significance level) of the causal effect of 
juvenile incarceration on high school completion and on 
adult recidivism. The sample includes all juveniles charged 
with a crime and brought before juvenile court, though not 
necessarily all were subsequently incarcerated. The analysis 
includes a vector of community x weapons-offense x year-
of-offense fixed effects, uses randomly assigned judges as 
an instrumental variable, and controls for demographic 
characteristics as well as for court variables. The regression 
results for homicide and drug crimes are not included in the 
figure since they are statistically insignificant at the 5 percent 
significance level. For more details, see Aizer and Doyle (2013).
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The Hamilton Project  •  Brookings  23
Hamilton Project Papers Related to Crime and 
Incarceration
• “A New Approach to Reducing Incarceration While 
Maintaining Low Rates of Crime”
Steven Raphael and Michael A. Stoll propose reforms that would 
reduce incarceration while keeping crime rates low by reforming 
sentencing practices and by creating incentives for local 
governments to avoid sentencing low-level offenders to prison.
• “Think Before You Act: A New Approach to Preventing  
Youth Violence and Dropout”
Jens Ludwig and Anuj Shah propose a federal government 
scale-up of behaviorally informed interventions intended to 
help disadvantaged youths recognize high-stakes situations 
when their automatic responses may be maladaptive and  
could lead to trouble. 
• “Thirteen Economic Facts about Social Mobility and the  
Role of Education”
The Hamilton Project examines the relationship between 
growing income inequality and social mobility in America. The 
memo explores the growing gap in educational opportunities 
and outcomes for students based on family income and the 
great potential of education to increase upward mobility for all 
Americans.
• “From Prison to Work: A Proposal for a National Prisoner 
Reentry Program”
Bruce Western proposes a national prisoner reentry program 
whose core element is up to a year of transitional employment 
available to all parolees in need of work.
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Crime rates have steadily declined over the past 
twenty-five years.
Low-income individuals are more likely than higher-
income individuals to be victims of crime.
The majority of criminal offenders are younger than 
age thirty.
Disadvantaged youths engage in riskier criminal 
behavior.
Federal and state policies have driven up the 
incarceration rate over the past thirty years.
The U.S. incarceration rate is more than six times that of 
the typical OECD nation.
There is nearly a 70 percent chance that an African 
American man without a high school diploma will be 
imprisoned by his mid-thirties.
Per capita expenditures on corrections more than tripled 
over the past thirty years.
By their fourteenth birthday, African American children 
whose fathers do not have a high school diploma are 
more likely than not to see their fathers incarcerated.
Juvenile incarceration can have lasting impacts on a 
young person’s future.
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Sources: Austin et al. 2000; Cahalan 1986; personal communication with E. Ann Carson, Bureau of Justice Statistics, January 24, 2014; Census Bureau 
2001; Glaze 2010, 2011; Glaze and Herberman 2013; Raphael and Stoll 2013; Sabol, Couture, and Harrison 2007; Sabol, West, and Cooper 2010; authors’ 
calculations.
Note: Incarceration rate refers to the total number of inmates in custody of local jails, state and federal prisons, and privately operated facilities within that 
year per 100,000 U.S. residents. The three events highlighted in this figure are examples of the many policy changes that are believed to have influenced the 
incarceration rate since the 1980s. For more details, see the technical appendix.
Incarceration Rate in the United States, 1960–2012
Federal policies, such as the Sentencing Reform Act, and state policies, such as “three strikes” legislation, were major 
contributing factors to the 222 percent increase in the incarceration rate between 1980 and 2012.
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Twenty-four states adopt or 
strengthen “three strikes” legislation
Sentencing Reform Act of 1984
Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986
